In this paper we propose and test a contracting mechanism, Multi-Contract Cost Sharing (MCCS), for use in the management of a sequence of projects. The mechanism is intended for situations where (1) the contractor knows more about the true costs of various projects than does the contracting agency (adverse selection), and (2) unobservable effort on the part of the contractor may lead to cost reductions (moral hazard). The proposed process is evaluated in an experimental environment that includes the essential economic features of the NASA process for the acquisition of Space Science Strategic missions. The environment is complex and the optimal mechanism is unknown. The design of the MCCS mechanism is based on the optimal contract for a simpler related environment. We compare the performance of the proposed process to theoretical benchmarks and to an implementation of the current NASA 'cost cap' procurement process. The data indicate that the proposed MCCS process generates significantly higher value per dollar spent than using cost caps, because it allocates resources more efficiently among projects and provides greater incentives to engage in cost-reducing innovations.
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Introduction
Many projects that provide a benefit to an entire organization are assigned to a specialized division for management while being funded through budgets at the headquarters level. Examples include the research division of a corporation, a team from a construction firm assigned to a building project, or a group of engineers and scientists assigned to develop a space mission. Often the division has better information about the eventual cost of the project than does headquarters. If the division's actions are not fully observable and if multiple divisions compete for the assignment of a project, the principal faces both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Without a proper contract to mitigate these problems, inefficiencies will arise in the assignment of the project and in the effort level of the division.
If the division (or more generally, the agent) and headquarters (the principal) are profit maximizers, then the structure of the optimal relationship or contract is well known.
1 We summarize this theory in Section 2. Under appropriate assumptions on the distribution and timing of information, the optimal contract can be implemented by the headquarters by offering a menu of linear contracts to the division such that for each realized private cost value, there is exactly one optimal contract for the division. Thus, the division's choice of the contract truthfully reveals its private information. The contract then specifies the percentage of costs to be shared between the division and the headquarters. When used in government procurement with private contractors, cost-sharing contracts have generally met with success.
2 1 This theory is due to Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993) . 2 There have been several instances of the use of cost-sharing contracts in US government procurement. All have used different cost sharing rules than the MCCS process. The Air Force Peace Shield program contract had an incentive structure where there was an agreed upon baseline cost, the Air Force paid 75% of any overrun, and the contractor kept 75% of any underrun. In addition, the contractor received a $50 million bonus if the project was completed early, and incurred a $50 m penalty for late delivery. There was a payment ceiling of 125% of the baseline cost. Another example is Lockheed Martin's contract for the F-117A in which the Defense Department and Lockheed Martin shared the cost of any overrun and savings from any underrun at a rate of 50%. 50-50 cost sharing also applied to the US Army's procurement of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). In 1987, the GAO conducted a review of 60 DOD incentive contracts and found that the final costs of the majority of contracts were within 5% of target costs. 47% were below and 53% were above target. 21% exceeded the original ceiling price (US Army, 2001) . Cox et al. (1996) compared cost sharing and fixed-price contracting in the laboratory. Their results indicate that cost sharing allows projects to be completed at lower cost than fixed price contracting. However, cost sharing is less efficient than fixed price contracting in the sense that the contract is less likely to be awarded to the lowest-cost contractor.
